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Introduction
• While there is a lot of focus on how a few key parameters like aperture size and pixel 
count drive costs of large space telescopes, the JWST experience suggests that a lot 
more insight is needed to understand and control costs
– Next level of detail to aperture size is how long does it take to design, fabricate, test etc. and this can 
be very dependent on specific requirements.
– A smaller mirror is not necessarily cheaper!
– Other large programs like Chandra backup this experience  
• From experience on JWST, no single area drove costs, no silver bullet
• As can be seen below, the cost resources are spread across all of the WBS elements 
suggesting there is no single metric that can alone be correlated to costs.
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JWST lessons learned
• In thinking about what actually drove things on JWST, there are five major 
areas that are critical to evaluate early in the program in order to control 
future large telescope costs:
– 1.  System complexity (multiple difficult  first of a kind challenges 
simultaneously, design complexity and iterations, etc.)
– 2.  Critical path and marching army driven by technical considerations (like being 
cryo, long manufacturing times)
– 3.  Verification challenges (modeling, facilities, test approach) 
– 4.  Programmatic constraints (funding/phasing, reserves, replans)
– 5.  Early integration and test considerations (practice, pathfinders, modularity)
• Many of these factors interact:  system complexity can drive critical path, 
phasing constraints can drive critical path, etc.
• The rest of this presentation will discuss how each of these areas impacted 
JWST and how we can mitigate these issues on future telescopes (eg, 
LUVOIR)
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1. System Complexity
• There were several system complexity factors that all had to be solved simultaneously 
leading to many design iterations, complex modeling, many system trades
– Cryogenic (50K) with tight performance requirements: lots of complex flexures, bond and 
joint complexity including cryo strength, cryo polishing while still 10’s of nanometer error 
budgets for mirrors and stability
– Low system margins (mass and volume) and associated programmatics
– Lightweight structures that have to be tested in 1-g (mirrors, backplane, sunshield)
– Large deployments, large number of single point failures, cryo shock 
– Optical quality, stability, sensitivity including MIR (thermal) and NIR (particulate)
– Large FOV’s in SI’s
– Large number of technology areas (10) – though early investment meant this was not a large 
driver
• Lessons Learned
– Focus on the minimum number of complex challenges that are needed to 
do the core science.  
– Don’t architect by committee – architect by logic
– Avoid short term decisions based on fiscal profiles (always consider 
lifecycle impacts) 4
2. Critical Path and Marching Army
• A really key issue for any program is the cost associated with fixed marching army over 
time                    cost = FTE x time (schedule)
• Schedule: JWST marching army is on board for 18 years 
• Marching Army on a program like this is large
• For JWST, funding constraints meant that critical path ran through telescope and 
instruments for over a decade which prevented starting other areas earlier 
– While aperture size was a factor in the mirror time, the funding constraint was actually a bigger issue as it 
stretched things out
• In addition, facilitization was needed which ate into the same resources needed for 
design 
• Cryo and being passive/thermal drove design times, test times on instruments and 
telescope
• Lesson Learned
– Prioritize schedule time and need for early resources, including: facilitization, 
mirror and structure fabrication times, design iterations, etc
– Use heritage to save tame and reduce risk, avoid recreating the wheel when you 
can.  Use a bigger picture strategy to design programs as a continuum.
– Combining cryo and performance together is challenging.  5
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Critical Path
NIRCAM spent 502 days in cryo testing at instrument, ISIM, OTIS level
Mirrors took 8 years to fabricate which was driven primarily by Beryllium polishing 
time (Beryllium was selected because of it’s cryo and performance properties)
Replan
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3a. Verification Of JWST On-Orbit Performance Using Analytical Models
 JWST is a passively stable lightweight cryo system and 
relies on model validation
 Validation:
 Prove what is mathematically modeled is what was actually built
 Prove interfaces are modeled correctly
• Building and validating models required substantial 
manpower, time, validation testing
• Correlated models, such as those on right, are used 
to predict/verify on-orbit performance of:
– Thermal Performance
– Optical Thermal Stability
– Dynamics
– Stray Light
• Tests at high levels of assembly conducted to verify 
“workmanship” and behavior of critical interfaces
• Lesson Learned
– Use robust designs and active controls to minimize the 
reliance on complex high fidelity models
• Architect the system to avoid reliance on complex 
modeling
– Avoid complicated modeling challenges like cryo with 
lightweight where you can’t solve it easily with 
robustness (cryo joints)
Stowed Deployed
Thermal Models
Stowed Deployed
Structural Dynamics Models
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Current “Cup Up” Configuration Eliminates Tower
and changed many of the alignment test approaches
3b.  Verification: System Testing
Original “Cup Down” Configuration
Included Large Metrology Tower
And Test Equipment Inside Shrouds
Lessons Learned:  
• Think about verification during the architecture phase
• Consider facilities, test strategies, necessary degrees of freedom
• Use active controls as your friend. 
• Measure what you need to measure 9
There were several iterations of the verification architecture as we got smarter on 
what needed to be verified and how best to do it
4. Programmatics/Phasing
• JWST had single digit reserves for many of the early years 
– Lack of early year reserves was the number 1 issue presented by at Mission PDR
• Had to push out work (spacecraft, mirrors, etc) due to lack 
of reserves
• Need for early year money for facilitization, technology 
maturity and complex design challenges needs to be 
factored against available phasing
• Lesson Learned
– Consider facilitization time and cost as opportunity cost
– Pick long lead items (eg, mirror and structure materials and 
temperatures) that don’t require long design, fabrication times (eg, 
material removal times, economies of scale, test time)
10
5. Integration and testing
• Due to volume and mass constraints, some aspects of 
JWST are not modular:
– Instruments installed in a sequence – doesn’t allow for easy late 
detector swapping without removing instruments
– Sunshield takes a long time to unfold and stow – workmanship 
take a long time to deal with
• Some areas of JWST had detailed pathfinders which 
allowed for practice and GSE checkout and greatly 
reduced risk, other areas did not have full scale high 
fidelity simulations leading to late schedule impacts
• Lesson Learned
– Build high fidelity pathfinders to vet out integration and test 
processes, ground support equipment, and allow for practice
– Strive for modularity in the design and the simplest possible 
interfaces including swap out of key risk items late in flow
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OTIS Risk Reduction at JSC
Optical Ground Support 
Equipment (OGSE) #1: Prove-
out optical GSE. Featured Cryo
Optical Test on Pathfinder OTE 
w/ 2 Spare PMSA’s and Spare 
Secondary
3 Pathfinder Tests/Rehearsals in JSC Chamber to test the test equipment and ready the test team – this was 
highly successful!  Same approach should be taken on large deployables.
OGSE #2: 2nd Cryo Optical Test 
but w/ Flight Aft Optics 
System and AOS Source Plate 
Assembly. Full check-out of 
optical GSE and measurement 
schemes
Thermal Pathfinder: Verified all 
thermal environment/boundary 
conditions (e.g., sunshield layer 
5 thermal simulator, ISIM 
radiator sinks)
Conclusions/Closing Thoughts
• To minimize costs, we need an approach that addresses the key items identified
– Faster critical path
– System complexity
– Verification Approach
– Programmatic constraints/phasing up front
– Early integration and test considerations (practice, pathfinders, modularity)
• Several next generation architectures are taking these recommendations in 
consideration:
– Not combining cryo and UV-optical
– Leveraging heritage where it makes
– Thinking about verification and adding in enough active controls
– Lots of other examples
• A well thought out architecture addressing the items identified here, can make 
a large impact on reducing total mission cost
• The only silver bullet to controlling cost is an early and continuous disciplined, 
informed, systematic approach to every aspect of the program and from all 
layers of the program
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